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Any Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol consists first of sequences of measurements
that produce some correlation between classical data. We show that these correlation data must
violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by
quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new
QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by
the no-signaling condition.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.65.-w, 03.67.-a
In 1991 Artur Ekert published his seminal paper Quan-
tum Cryptography based on Bell’s theorem [1]. For the
first time, it was argued that quantum nonlocality could
be good for something! It was already known, since 1964,
that quantum correlations allow one to perform some
tasks classically impossible, like violating Bell’s inequal-
ity between space-like separated regions [2]. But Ekert’s
proposal was the first addressing a useful task and this
had a huge impact on the development of Quantum In-
formation Science. Yet, none of today’s security proofs
of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) make a direct use
of quantum nonlocality (see however the recent work of
Ref. [3]). The existing proofs are either based on the
no-cloning theorem, or on the monogamy (i.e. non share-
ability) of entanglement. All proofs heavily exploit the
Hilbert space artillery of quantum physics.
In the recent years, quantum nonlocality underwent
yet another important twist. Thanks to the seminal pa-
per by Popescu and Rohrlich [4], it was realized that
one can study nonlocality without Hilbert space. Indeed,
although quantum states violate Bell inequalities, there
is nothing quantum in the derivation of a Bell inequal-
ity. The picture is richer when one adds the assump-
tion of no-signaling, i.e. that the correlations between
distant partners cannot be used to send information, as
is the case for quantum correlations. The no-signaling
principle suffices to severely limit the set of correlations.
Formally, a correlation is a conditional probability dis-
tribution P (a, b|x, y), where a and b are Alice and Bob’s
output data, respectively, and x and y are their choices
of inputs. For instance, x and y could be their choice of
measurement settings and a and b the obtained results.
The no-signaling condition implies that the marginals are
independent of the partner’s input:
P (a|x, y) =
∑
b
P (a, b|x, y) = P (a|x). (1)
For finite alphabets for inputs and outputs, the set of
all these correlations is convex with a finite number of
extremal points, hence it is a polytope. This new con-
ceptual tool allows one for the first time to study quan-
tum nonlocality from the outside, that is without all the
Hilbert space machinery. Several recent papers explore
this new avenue [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. In particular, it is proven in
[8, 9] that no-signaling alone implies that nonlocal corre-
lations are also monogamous since they cannot be cloned.
It is thus natural to ask whether, as suggested by Artur
Ekert, the security of QKD does not rely, ultimately, on
quantum nonlocality. At first sight this seems unlikely.
The standard answer runs as follows: if Alice and Bob
are sufficiently entangled, then the adversary Eve is es-
sentially factorized out. Despite this standard answer,
the situation is more subtle: If the Alice-Bob correlation
is local, it can be reproduced by (classical or quantum)
variables coming from a source. However, a perfect copy
of these variables could also be sent to Eve. Then it
could be that Alice and Bob share a separable states of
larger dimension! Indeed, the local variables necessarily
enlarge Alice and Bob’s Hilbert space. As an example,
consider BB84 [10], where Alice and Bob choose between
two different measurements. Their correlation can be re-
produced by the four-qubit separable state
ρAB =
1
4
(|00〉〈00|z + |11〉〈11|z)⊗ (|00〉〈00|x + |11〉〈11|x).
(2)
Here, Alice holds the first and third qubit. Whenever
she measures in the z (x) basis she is actually measuring
the first (third) qubit in this basis. The same happens
for Bob, with the second and fourth qubit. Clearly, their
measurement results are completely correlated when the
bases agree and uncorrelated otherwise. However their
state is separable, so BB84 becomes insecure even in the
ideal noise-free situation! In summary, all security proofs
of QKD assume that the legitimate partners, Alice and
Bob, know the dimensions of the Hilbert space describing
their quantum systems. In practice, this is usually a rea-
sonable assumption, however it underlines that assump-
tions are necessary for any security proof. Moreover it is
conceptually interesting to disentangle the consequences
of no-signaling from those relying on the Hilbert space
2formalism. Experimentally, additional Hilbert-space di-
mensions correspond to “side-channels”, i.e. to degrees of
freedom coded accidentally. For example, in photon po-
larization coding, the wavelength could be accidentally
correlated to the state of polarization.
In this letter, we first present a new 4-state QKD proto-
col, next demonstrate its security against any individual
attack by any adversary only limited by the no-signaling
condition [3]. In particular, Eve could be supra-quantum,
since there are nonsignaling correlations not achievable
using quantum states [4]. In the new protocol, Alice and
Bob have for each realization the choice between two
measurements with binary outcomes. Essential is that
their measured data violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) Bell inequality [11]:
P (a0 = b0) + P (a0 = b1) + P (a1 = b0) + P (a1 6= b1) ≤ 3,
(3)
where P (aj = bk) = P (a = b = 0|x = j, y = k) + P (a =
b = 1|x = j, y = k). For example, Alice and Bob
could share a Werner state, ρW = WPφ+ + (1 −W )1/4,
with visibility W , where Pφ+ denotes the projector onto
|φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2, and perform the measurements
that maximize the violation of the CHSH-Bell inequal-
ity (3). But any other way to obtain data violating (3)
is equally good. Hence we name our new protocol the
CHSH-protocol. Violation of (3) implies that in three
out of the four measurement choices, Alice and Bob are
correlated (the three first terms in (3)), though not nec-
essarily maximally, while in the fourth case they are anti-
correlated. The analog of basis reconciliation goes as fol-
lows: Bob announces all his measurement settings, Alice
keeps all her data, but for the case of anti-correlation,
she flips her bit. Compared to BB84, the partners keep
all data, however, all data are noisy. For W > 1/
√
2 the
new protocol produces data that violate Bell’s inequality.
Hence there are no local variables that Eve could hold.
In the sequence, we limit our analysis to isotropic raw
correlations with visibility V :
P (a, b|x, y) = V 1
2
δ(a+ b = x · y) + (1− V )1
4
(4)
where δ(r = s) = 1 whenever the equality holds modulo
2, and 0 overwise. For V ≤ 1/√2, such correlations can
be distributed by quantum physics (e.g. by a Werner
state with W =
√
2V ) and for V > 1/2 they violate
the Bell inequality (3). This does not imply any loss of
generality: Alice and Bob can map any binary correlation
into these isotropic correlations by local operations and
classical communication keeping the Bell violation [9].
Let us study the security of this protocol. As usual, it
is assumed that the distribution of the correlation is done
by Eve. Any attack consists of a three-party distribution
FIG. 1: Pictorial representation of nonsignaling correlations
P (a, b|x, y) for binary inputs and outputs. The thick lines
define one of the facets of the polytope of local models, or lo-
cal polytope, corresponding to the CHSH inequality. All the
extreme points lying on this facet are also extreme points of
the more general polytope of nonsignaling correlations. Only
one extremal point is on top of the CHSH facet, given by
the nonlocal machine. The curved line schematically repre-
sents the region of points achievable using quantum states.
Isotropic correlations (4) lie along the vertical line starting
from the nonlocal machine and entering the local polytope
through the center of the CHSH facet. In the optimal eaves-
dropping attack, Eve simulates Alice and Bob’s correlation,
square point, by the proper combination of extreme points of
the general polytope, circles in the figure.
P (a, b, e|x, y, z) whose marginal is (4):
P (a, b|x, y) =
∑
e
P (a, b, e|x, y, z)
=
∑
e
P (e|z)P (a, b|x, y, z, e). (5)
where for the second equality we used the no-signaling
condition: Eve’s output e is independent of Alice and
Bob’s inputs x and y. We can restrict our considera-
tions to attacks where Eve prepares extreme points of
Alice and Bob’s no-signaling polytope. Indeed, consider
an attack where this is not the case, that is, some of the
terms appearing in Eq. (5) do not correspond to an ex-
treme point of Alice-Bob’s no-signaling polytope. Then,
these terms can be expressed as a convex combination of
extreme points
P (a, b|x, y, z, e) =
∑
λ
Pext(a, b|x, y, z, e, λ)P (λ). (6)
Giving the knowledge of λ to Eve, one has an attack
consisting of extreme points and that is at least as good
as the previous one, since, c.f. (5),
P (a, b|x, y) =
∑
e,λ
P (e, λ|z)Pext(a, b|x, y, z, e, λ). (7)
We need to recall now some facts about nonsignaling cor-
relations with binary input and output. Barrett and co-
workers proved that in this simple binary case, the num-
ber of extremal nonsignaling correlations is very limited
3[5]. If moreover one concentrates on the correlations that
violate the CHSH-Bell inequality, then one finds a unique
extremal correlation that violates it; this is the isotropic
correlation (4) with V = 1. This correlation appears in
the literature as PR-box [5], or NonLocal Machine [6] or
Unit of Nonlocality [7]. Moreover, there are 8 extremal
correlations that saturate the inequality (3), see Fig. 1.
For the local points, all the outcomes are determinis-
tic and known by Eve. However, if Alice and Bob share
a nonlocal machine, they have the guarantee of perfect
monogamy [5], so Eve cannot be correlated at all. Eve’s
optimal attack then consists of the combination of ex-
treme points that mimics Alice-Bob’s correlation with
the minimal weight for nonlocal points. Therefore, she
prepares only those local points that are closer to Alice
and Bob’s correlation. This can be easily understood in
Figure 1: in order to reproduce the quantum correlation
observed by Alice and Bob, represented by a square, Eve
should send an equal mixture of the eight local points ly-
ing on the facet, plus the nonlocal machine on top of it.
In what follows pNL denotes the probability that Eve pre-
pares a nonlocal machine. The Bell violation observed by
Alice and Bob fixes the value of pNL, since pNL = 2V −1.
When the observed data are local, Eve can mimic them
with deterministic local points. However, when the cor-
relation is nonlocal, Eve is sometimes forced to send a
nonlocal machine, where she cannot be correlated be-
cause of the no-signaling principle. The resulting prob-
ability distribution, after basis reconciliation, is summa-
rized in Table I, where pL = 1 − pNL. Eve’s informa-
tion on Alice and Bob’s outcomes is represented by two
variables (ea, eb). The value at each position of the ta-
ble gives the probability for the corresponding outcomes,
e.g. P (a = 0, b = 0, e = (?, 0)) = pL/8. Notice that
since only Bob announces his measurement, Eve some-
times has deterministic information on Bob’s but not on
Alice’s symbol after the basis reconciliation, even if her
preparation was local. For example, consider the instance
when Bob announces y = 1, then, even when Eve knows
a0 and a1, she might not know Alice’s output. Moreover,
one can see that, due to the properties of the local points
lying on the CHSH facet, Eve has full information on
both outcomes only when a = b.
Once the optimal individual attack has been deter-
mined, it is time to study the secrecy properties of the
resulting probability distribution. One can see that: (i) a
secure key can already be established with one-way com-
munication protocols and quantum states, (ii) this proba-
bility distribution contains secret correlations if and only
if the CHSH inequality is violated, i.e. pNL > 0, and
(iii) it seems challenging to reach the Bell violation limit,
pNL = 0, by means of the known two-way advantage
distillation techniques. The detailed calculation of these
results will be given in a forthcoming paper [12].
In the case of one-way distillation protocols, it is clear
that the flow of information has to go from Alice to Bob.
b 0 1
a (e)
(0,0) pL/4
0 (?,0) pL/8 (?,0) pL/8
(?,?) pNL/2
(1,1) pL/4
1 (?,1) pL/8 (?,1) pL/8
(?,?) pNL/2
TABLE I: Eve’s optimal individual attack. Alice and Bob’s
variables are binary, while Eve’s information can be repre-
sented by two ternary variables, ea, eb = 0, 1, ?. The value
’?’ denotes those cases where she has no information. For
example, (?,0) means that Eve knows b = 0 but not a.
Indeed, since Bob announces the basis, Eve’s information
on his outcome is larger. From Table I one has that Bob’s
error probability is εB = pL/4, while I(A : E) = pL/2.
Then, the one-way key rate, K→, satisfies [13]
K→ ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E) = 1− h(pL/4)− pL
2
, (8)
where h is the binary entropy. This quantity is positive
for pNL & 0.318. The quantum region is given by pNL ≤√
2−1 ≃ 0.414, so quantum correlations suffice to achieve
security against individual nonsignaling attacks.
Next, one can prove that the obtained probability dis-
tribution contains secret correlations if and only if there
is a Bell inequality violation. We take as a measure
of secret correlations the so-called intrinsic information,
I(A : B ↓ E) or more briefly I↓, introduced in [14]. A
tripartite probability distribution can be established by
public communication if and only if the intrinsic informa-
tion is zero [15]. It was shown in [9] that if none of the
parties announces the choice of bases, the set of local and
public correlations are equivalent, under the no-signaling
principle. Here, Bob announces his basis through the
public channel, so it could happen that the honest par-
ties loose some secrecy. One can see however, that the
intrinsic information still remains positive for the whole
region of Bell violation, since
I↓ = h(1− pNL/2)− 1 + pNL
4
h
(
1− pNL
1 + pNL
)
. (9)
In order to get this result, we numerically compute I↓ for
different values of pNL. In all the cases, we found a per-
fect agreement with this formula. Interestingly, if Alice
announces her basis too, I↓ = 0 when pNL ≤ 1/5 [12].
We also analyze the use of the two-way advantage dis-
tillation protocol of Ref. [16]. Advantage distillation
moves the region of positive key rate to pNL > 1/5 [12].
The use of pre-processing by the parties, as studied in
Ref. [17], is useful in all the situations. The correspond-
ing one-way key rate as a function of the disturbance D
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FIG. 2: Key rates using one-way communication against
nonsignaling individual attacks. The dashed line corresponds
to the situation where no pre-processing is employed, while
the thick one to the optimal pre-processing. In the inset, the
key rate against a standard quantum eavesdropper is given,
compared to BB84 (dashed line).
in the quantum channel is shown in Figure 2. The distur-
bance is defined in the standard way, namely D = 0 cor-
responds to a perfect channel, and pNL =
√
2(1−2D)−1.
The critical disturbance is D . 6.3%. Note a fundamen-
tal difference between our security analysis and Ekert’s
protocol: in his scheme, D = 0 guarantees perfect secu-
rity. This is not the case here, since the eavesdropper is
only limited by the no-signaling principle. In the case of
two-way communication, a positive key rate is obtained
when D . 11.36%, or pNL & 0.093, still not sufficient
to cover the region of Bell violation. Therefore, the bi-
nary probability distribution of Table I, when the Bell
violation is small, either contains bipartite bound infor-
mation [18] or is distillable using a new technique. Both
alternatives appear very interesting.
Finally, it is also relevant to study the protocol in the
standard scenario where the eavesdropper is quantum
and Alice and Bob know their Hilbert spaces. A gen-
eral security proof is beyond the scope of the present
work. Here, we study the simple case of collective at-
tacks, where Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to share
copies of the same state. We compare the obtained rates
with those for the BB84 protocol [10] in Ref. [17], see
Fig. 2. The quantum rates for our protocol without pre-
processing are the same as for BB84 with pre-processing
given by γ = sin2(pi/8) [19]. For high disturbances, Alice
starts adding noise, achieving the same rates and critical
disturbance as for BB84, namely D = 12.4% [17].
To summarize, usual security proofs of QKD are based
on entanglement theory. However, entanglement theory,
like e.g. entanglement witnesses, assume fixed dimen-
sions for Alice and Bob’s Hilbert spaces. If data do not
violate any Bell inequality, then they can be produced
by quantum measurements on a separable state of large
dimension (the extra dimension allows one to include all
supplementary local variables). Hence no QKD could be
achieved without either a violation of some Bell inequal-
ity, or assumptions about the dimension of the relevant
Hilbert spaces. In this letter we presented a QKD proto-
col aimed at producing data that violate the CHSH-Bell
inequality. We proved its security against the most gen-
eral individual attack without signaling, independently of
any assumption about Hilbert spaces. To our knowledge,
our results represent the first step towards the charac-
terization of optimal nonsignaling eavesdropping attacks.
Note also that the same data, i.e., same state preparation
and measurements, can be secure in the standard quan-
tum scenario or against no-signalling eavesdroppers: only
the amount of error correction and privacy amplification
has to be changed. We would like to conclude with a
comment on the role played by Bell inequalities in our
discussion. It is often said that any Bell inequality is
just an example of an, often non-optimal, entanglement
witness. However, they are more than this, since they
are derived without invoking the quantum formalism. As
shown here, they are witnesses of useful correlations in-
dependent of the Hilbert space structure.
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